A Great Plains Presidential Primary? by McDowell, James L.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Great Plains Research: A Journal of Natural and 
Social Sciences Great Plains Studies, Center for 
October 1997 
A Great Plains Presidential Primary? 
James L. McDowell 
Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsresearch 
 Part of the Other International and Area Studies Commons 
McDowell, James L., "A Great Plains Presidential Primary?" (1997). Great Plains Research: A Journal of 
Natural and Social Sciences. 332. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsresearch/332 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Research: A 
Journal of Natural and Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - 
Lincoln. 
Great Plains Research 7 (Fa1l1997): 179-207
© Copyright by the Center for Great Plains Studies
A GREAT PLAINS PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY?
James L. McDowell
Department of Political Science
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809
Abstract. This paper examines the feasibility of establishing a regional
presidential primary for the Great Plains States. It reviews the introduction
ofprimaries for selecting national convention delegates, and the slowness of
these states to adopt this method. Further, it surveys the use of the primary
in the region, noting the independence ofGreat Plains voters in both the pre-
reform and post-reform periods. Finally, the paper recommends that Great
Plains States adopt a regional primary; suggests they select the earliest
possible date in order to enhance their influence on the selection ofpresi-
dential nominees; and offers several alternative proposals, depending upon
whether the states of Texas and, possibly, Oklahoma are retained as part of
such a regional primary.
The presidential primary has become the accepted method of selecting
delegates to national party conventions. No longer is a primary simply a
"beauty contest" in which presidential aspirants may demonstrate vote-
getting abilities in the hope of attracting organizational support; nor is it a
process by which "favorite sons" can gain blocs of delegates to be used as
bargaining chips to select a standard bearer in a brokered convention. In the
past generation, as Davis (1980) observed, the primary has become the main
"road to the White House."
However, while most other states in the nation slowly but eventually.
joined the parade of primaries, a resistance to political change has created a
serious problem for the Great Plains States. But for Nebraska and South
Dakota, participants from the beginning, this region long remained a hold-
out, resulting in further reduction of its already modest impact on the presi-
dential nominating process. Even in the 1990s, North Dakota and South
Dakota Democrats retained a caucus system, and Texas Democrats em-
ployed a hybrid system with approximately one-third of Texas delegates
selected in a post-primary caucus. In 1996, Kansas decided to cancel both
primaries as the incumbent president was unopposed and the Republican
nominee had all but won the nomination by mid-March.
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Is it too late for the road to the White House to take a detour through
Bismarck and Pierre, to pass through Lincoln and Topeka, to include Okla-
homa City and Austin on its route? Or, for that matter, any other Great Plains
community? And, indeed, to make these significant stops along the way? In
other words, is a Great Plains presidential primary feasible at this point in
time?
The Great Plains is an area considered by many outsiders, including
most presidential aspirants, as "flyover states," that is, states one flies over in
traveling from one coast to the other. More seriously, this is a region that has
been described as cutting "an immense swath through America," but also
"our most static region, . . . changing only under extraordinary stress"
(Peirce and Hagstrom 1983:29); as "a much greater area than is usually
designated-an area which may be best defined in terms of topography,
vegetation, and rainfall" (Webb 1931:3); and as "a hinterland, an area set
apart" though making up as much as one-fifth of the land area of the United
States (Kraenzel 1955:212).
While in agreement that vastness and isolation distinguish this area
from other parts of the country, observers sometimes disagree as to exactly
which states comprise this region. Virtually everyone is in accord when
speaking of New England or the South-regions with distinct character and
tradition. Even the label Border States conveys a signal set of political units.
This is not necessarily the case regarding the Great Plains. Social historians
have tended to take a geographical perspective, including at least portions of
Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico (Webb 1931:3-5; Kraenzel
1955: 3). A leading political writer, on the other hand, discusses "the nine
states of the Great Plains that constitute the very heart of the American
continent" which in his view include the states of Iowa, Minnesota, and
Missouri (Peirce 1973:15).
For purposes of this paper, the Great Plains is defined narrowly as the
column of states which bisect the nation from North Dakota south through
Texas. There is justification for this decision. Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri
not only continue to cling to the caucus system for delegate selection but also
lie east of the 98th meridian, the standard line of demarcation which regional
writers have used to denote the eastern edge of the Great Plains. Likewise,
Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, and New Mexico often are classified as
Rocky Mountain states.
It is not easy to understand the slowness with which these Great Plains
states embraced the direct primary as a form of delegate selection, especially
given the history of populist, progressive, even radical political leanings-at
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least within the three northern Plains states. For example, as one of the
region's acclaimed historians pointed out in 1931:
Woman's suffrage does not now come under the head of politi-
cal radicalism, but it was so considered until a few years ago.... If
we examine the history of the woman's movement, we find that it
spread practically all over the Great Plains before it was adopted in
the East. The map [showing the status of women's suffrage at the
time the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted] tells the story; it
makes clear what happened.... It was not the vaunted chivalry of
the South nor the cool justice of the Brahman of the North that gave
women the ballot. There is hidden somewhere in the cause the spirit
of the Great Plains which made men democratic in deed and in truth.
(Webb 1931 :504-05)
However, Webb's (1931: 504) own map showed that Nebraska, North Da-
kota, and Texas were three of only five states between the 98th meridan and
the Pacific Ocean, which did not grant women the right to vote prior to
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.
It would appear, therefore, that the spirit of democracy, at least in
regard to women's suffrage, was slow to gain acceptance in several Plains
states. They also initially proved no more eager than most to extend demo-
cratic theory into practice by adopting a direct primary to select convention
delegates. Further, even after the post-1968 presidential nomination reforms
were introduced to nearly every other portion of the country, non-primary
Plains states remained resistant to change. This failure to adapt has not been
a positive factor for the Great Plains states. Nor has the refusal, until very
recently, to advance the dates of delegate-selection been of political benefit
to the region. The increase in the number of states using primaries from only
15 as recently as 1968 to some 40 in 1996, the "frontloading" of primaries by
the "megastates," and the move to establish same-day regional primaries in
other parts of the country have combined to diminish the political impor-
tance of the Great Plains region. Consider the following:
1. While many other states jumped on the primary bandwagon,
the Great Plains states continued to plod along. Consequently, they
found their political voices muted. By selecting delegates mostly in
scattered caucuses, the Great Plains states failed to gain the publicity
focused by the national media on states with primary campaigns. Print
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reporters and television commentators flocked to New Hampshire, and
Iowa after 1976, and descended on Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles and
other metropolitan centers, anointing winners and proclaiming losers.
But these media people had little or no reason to cover the quiet
caucuses and occasional primaries in the Great Plains.
2. In recent years, most of the nation's larger states have engaged
in frontloading, that is they have rescheduled their primary elections to
the early portion of a now sharply-reduced time frame or "window" for
choosing delegates. This was done not only to counteract the perceived
undue importance placed on the outcomes of the small-state Iowa
caucuses and New Hampshire primary, but also to enhance their own
importancein the overall process (Buell 1996:7). While this was hap-
pening, the Great Plains states largely refused to take heed. As a result,
this region has failed to playa forceful role in the winnowing process.
By the time the delegate-selection process reached most of the Great
Plains states, there was no separation of worthwhile candidates from
lesser ones which remained to be accomplished; many hopefuls, how-
ever qualified, had already been flushed from the system.
3. Among the Great Plains states, only Texas qualifies as one of
the ten most populous megastates. It was not until 1988 that Texas, as
well as Oklahoma, the region's second-largest state but only the nation's
28th in population, scheduled primaries in March in order to have an
early impact on the nominating process. These states retained their
March primaries in 1996 and, to their credit, the Dakotas also held
early delegate-selection procedures that year (February Republican
primaries and March Democratic caucuses); but Kansas (April) and
Nebraska (May) continued to set their primaries well after the date by
which most observers had expected the 1996 nominees already would
be determined. In the meantime, seven of the other most populous
states (all but Pennsylvania and New Jersey) also had moved their
primaries into the month of March.
4. Finally, there has been the movement to create same-day re-
gional primaries. The best-known of these is the South's "Super Tues-
day" which gained prominence (though not as intended) in 1988 when
14 Southern and Border states, plus three other states, conducted pri-
maries on March 8. But, in 1996 the Southern regional primary was less
"super" with only seven states taking part and not even the first of the
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regional primaries. Depending on the political party, it was not even
necessarily the largest of the same-day delegate harvests available. As
Table 1 shows, the nine states participating in the "Junior Tuesday"
primaries actually selected more Democratic delegates (643) than those
voting on Super Tuesday (535).
First, there was the "Yankee Primary" segment of Junior Tuesday (all
New England states except, of course, New Hampshire on March 5, plus
New York on March 7); three other states also conducted elections on March
5. Then came Super Tuesday on March 12, now involving only four Southern
states, plus Oklahoma, Texas and Oregon. March 19 saw the initial "Big 10"
or "Great Lakes Primary" (Illinois, Ohio and Wisconsin, plus Michigan
Republicans). Finally, California, virtually a "region" of its own, with its
cornucopia of delegates for both parties, voted March 26, along with Repub-
licans in Nevada and Washington in a "West Coast Primary."
Because of the concentration of delegate selection in March, veteran
political observers (Barone and Ujifusa 1995; Wayne 1996) anticipated well
before the balloting even began that the presidential nominations would be
decided in a 44-day period between the Iowa caucuses and the California
primary. Over two-thirds of the delegates were to be selected in this time
span. The combination of these three factors-the failure to adopt the pri-
mary until only recently, the frontloading by the more populous states, and
the creation of several regional primaries-has not only crowded the Great
Plains states out of primetime but also seriously hampered their chances of
establishing a separate political identity.
In considering whether the creation of a Great Plains Presidential
Primary is feasible-or even necessary, one need dwell not only on history
but also on contemporary facts:
1. The Great Plains region consists of six states which, in spite of
their locations, are not necessarily all that homogeneous. Elazar (1984)
has distinguished three separate political subcultures within the United
States. These political subcultures foster different political systems
that function in distinctive ways although they share common govern-
mental structure and political processes. His categories indicate that
Oklahoma and Texas are especially different from the other Great
Plains States.
He classifies the northern Great Plains states as being primarily influ-
enced by the "moralistic" political culture; thus, politics is issue-oriented
184 Great Plains Research Vol. 7 No.2, 1997
TABLE 1
DELEGATE SELECTION IN REGIONAL PRIMARIES, 1996
Democrat Republican
JUNIOR TUESDAY (March 5)
Yankee Primary
Connecticut
Maine (D only)
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Vermont
New York (March 7)
(Yankee Primary Total)
Colorado
Georgia
Maryland
Junior Tuesday Total
SUPER TUESDAY (March 12)
53 27
23
93 37
22 16
15 12
244 93a
450 185
49 27
76 42
68 32
643 101
Florida
Louisiana
Mississippi
Oklahoma
Oregon
Tennessee
Texas'
Super Tuesday Total
GREAT LAKES PRIMARY (March 19)
Illinois
Michigan (R only)
Ohio
Wisconsin
Great Lakes Total
WEST COAST PRIMARY (March 26)
California
Nevada (R only)
Washington (R only)
West Coast Total
152
59
38
44
47
68
27
535
164
147
93
390
363
363
98
9b
33
38
23
38
123
362
69
57
67
36
229
165
14
18
197
New York Republicans also selected 9 delegates in state convention.
Louisiana Republicans also selected 21 delegartes in caucuses.
Texas Democrats also selected 70 delegates, named by a delegate nominating
committee, at a statewide caucus.
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and programmatic, operating for the "public interest." In contrast, he consid-
ers Oklahoma and Texas as more closely associated with the "traditionalis-
tic" political culture which dominates the states of the Old Confederacy;
here, political purpose is more limited, the major goal being to maintain the
status quo, that is, preserve the established order. Elazar notes that popula-
tion growth and movement has altered these classifications somewhat and
helped to keep cultural patterns fluid. All these states have been influenced
to some degree by the "individualistic" subculture in which politics is more
partisan and less oriented toward collective goals. But Oklahoma and Texas
remain distinctly more in tune with the South, in terms of political culture,
than with their Great Plains neighbors.
2. Except for Texas, all of the Great Plains states have modest
populations, ranking in the lower half of the nation's states (from 28th
to 47th in the 1990 census), and have correspondingly modest political
influence. Excluding Texas, the remaining five states together have but
25 electoral votes, or 4.6% of the national total of 538. Including Texas'
32 electoral votes raises the Great Plains total to only 57, or 10.6% of
the total.
3. These states together had but 328 of the 3,521 delegates se-
lected in primaries or caucuses to the 1996 Democratic National Con-
vention in Chicago, a mere 9.3%. These figures exclude 769 automatic
or "super" delegates-officially "unpledged"-awarded by the party
to a state's Democratic governor, members of Congress, national com-
mittee members, and others designated as "distinguished party lead-
ers." The region supplied 252 of the 1,990 delegates to the 1996 Repub-
lican National Convention in San Diego, or 12.7%. Again excluding
Texas (194 Democratic delegates and 123 Republican delegates se-
lected in primaries or caucuses), the remaining Great Plains states had
but 134, or 3.8% of the Democratic delegates, and 129, or 6.5% of the
Republican delegates in 1996.
4. This, of course, brings us to the matter of Texas, which as the
second largest state in area and the third most populous in the nation,
dominates the region politically. With 194 Democratic delegates and
123 Republican delegates, Texas alone supplied 59.1 %t of the Demo-
crats and 48.8% of the Republicans chosen to attend national conven-
tions from the region in 1996. In contemplating the feasibility of a
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Great Plains presidential primary, one must consider whether the ex-
clusion of Texas would be beneficial to the other states in the region.
Before speculating on where the Great Plains states might go from
here, however, this paper will examine the evolution of the presidential
nominating system in the Twentieth Century and review the participation of
the Great Plains States in the process.
Development of Presidential Primaries
The introduction of the direct primary as a device for selecting del-
egates to a national party convention is the latest in a series of methods
employed for choosing presidential nominees. In the 80 years from the first
convention in 1832 to "the famous scene of political carnage" at the 1912
Republican convention "when Theodore Roosevelt stood at the Armaged-
don," (Moos and Hess 1960:22) the only basic change to the nomination
process was the introduction and the widespread use of the presidential
primary.
With the coming of the primary in the Twentieth Century, rank-and-file
members of the political parties could formally participate in the delegate-
selection process. This was intended to "democratize" the process, by taking
the control over nominations away from the party bosses and shifting it to
regular party supporters (Lengle 1981:7-9).
Florida was the first state to use the direct primary. In 1904, Florida's
Democrats decided to replace the traditional caucus/convention system and
allow party voters to select delegates under provisions of a new law permit-
ting any recognized political party to hold a primary election. Wisconsin
enacted a primary law in 1905 designed specifically for choosing convention
delegates. Voters there employed it in 1908 to pick a Republican delegation
pledged to Senator Robert LaFollette and the principles of the Progressive
movement. Oregon went a step further in 1910, by providing not only for
election of delegates from congressional districts but also by creating a
presidential preference vote to "guide" delegates in their convention delib-
erations (David et al. 1960: 225). Celebrated as a cornerstone of Progressive
Era reform efforts, the direct primary movement had spread by 1912 to some
13 states, including Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota; four years
later, parties in 20 states used some form of a presidential primary (Coleman
et al. 1992:25).
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With the end of the Progressive Era and the "return to normalcy" after
World War I, the primary movement stalled. Some states, including North
Dakota, abandoned the practice. Authorities, including Coleman (Coleman
et al. 1992) and Wayne (1996), disagree over the exact number of states
using primaries but, over the next six-plus decades, no more than 15 states
consistently conducted presidential primaries in any form-from "beauty
contest" to actual delegate selection. I Voter sentiment expressed in primaries
had relatively little influence over convention decisions, not only because
there were relatively few primaries held but also because most were in less
populous states with relatively small convention delegations. State party
organizations and political bosses from the larger states, therefore, contin-
ued to control presidential nominations, going along with popular sentiment
only when it matched their desires.
The Old Order Changeth. The degree of organizational control is illus-
trated, and probably not overstated, by this recollection of Newton Minow.
Head of the Federal Communications Commission during the Kennedy
administration, Minow returned to Chicago after resigning his position. He
describes a leisurely lunch in 1963 with Mayor Richard J. Daley, who asked:
"Isn't there any political office that interests you?" I told him there
was one: delegate to the Democratic National Convention from
Illinois.
He groaned, and said "Newt, why don't you ask me for some-
thing easy? That's the hardest thing you could ask me for. Everyone
wants to be a delegate. Are you sure you're not interested in running
for Governor or Senator?" (Minow 1979:8)
At that time, delegates in Illinois were picked by party leaders behind
closed doors. As late as 1968, only 15 states used some form of the direct
primary to select some or all of their delegates to the national conventions.
That year, Democrats selected only 40.2% and Republicans but 38.1 % of
convention delegates in primary elections (Goldstein 1995:26). Thus, it was
not all that surprising that Vice President Hubert Humphrey and former Vice
President Richard Nixon, both longtime party figures, were convention
nominees in 1968.
Humphrey, of course, was precluded from seeking the nomination until
after the sudden withdrawal of President Lyndon Johnson on March 31. But
he won the nomination on the first ballot, gaining two-thirds of the delegate
votes despite not have entered a single primary. Wayne (1996:93) suggests
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the vice president purposely delayed his entry into the race for a month in
order to miss primary filing deadlines because he did not have the grass-
roots organization of other contenders. With this approach, he also was able
to avoid anti-Vietnam protesters on the campaign trail.
Nixon, on the other hand, had actively campaigned in the primaries; he
needed to demonstrate an ability to attract popular support following his
losses in the 1960 presidential race and the 1962 California gubernatorial
contest. Although he won more states and generally the larger states, Nixon
narrowly lost the total popular primary vote to California Governor Ronald
Reagan. Nixon managed a slender first-ballot victory by only 25 votes more
than the 667 needed, as Reagan and New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller
divided the opposition vote. One account of the 1968 Republican convention
attributes the Nixon win to his long-range planning but also suggests that the
party leadership viewed Reagan and Rockefeller as representing the extreme
ends of the political spectrum. Thus, party regulars preferred Nixon as a
"safer" and "more electable" candidate. Still, one observer implies that
Nixon could have been nominated only on the first ballot and lists a number
of "ifs" that might have "thrown the convention into chaos" had they oc-
curred (White 1969:287-88). Had these slippages happened, a "dream ticket,"
proposed by publications such as Time, of Reagan and Rockefeller-in
either order-might have resulted. Organization support was still signifi-
cant in 1968, and primaries were not yet the corridor to power. However, the
events of 1968 would be a watershed in American presidential politics.
The Humphrey first-ballot nomination victory was marred by the vio-
lence in the Chicago streets and raucous behavior in the convention hall, and
his narrow popular vote defeat in the general election led to calls for reform
of the nominating process, at least in the Democratic party. The result was
the creation of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection,
more commonly known as the "McGovern-Fraser Commission" after its co-
chairmen, South Dakota Senator George McGovern and Minnesota Repre-
sentative Donald Fraser.
The Impact ofParty Reforms. The work of the McGovern-Fraser Com-
mission altered the process for selecting presidential nominees in four ways,
not all of which necessarily had the intended result:
1. By banning caucus systems involving only party officials and
officeholders, it led to the revitalization of the primary as the means for
greater party rank-and-file participation.
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2. By involving party activists in the process, as opposed to mainly
party officials and officeholders and requiring proportionate represen-
tation of minorities, women, and youth, it led to the selection of Demo-
cratic convention delegates and, ultimately, several presidential nomi-
nees unrepresentative of the party's traditional voting population.
3. By failing to win the presidency in four of the five elections
after adopting these reforms, it prompted the Democratic party to find
it necessary to undergo a quadrennial reassessment of its delegate-
selection procedures.
4. By requiring state parties to adhere to national party rules, it led
state legislatures to revise statutes governing delegate selection which,
in most states, applied to Republicans as well as to Democrats.
Since the new state legislation often applied to both parties, it would
have a significant impact on Republicans. Without suffering the trauma and
travail of changing party rules or delegate apportionment formulas on a
quadrennial basis, yet conforming to the "open" selection process of the
primary, Republicans by 1980 were choosing more delegates in primaries
than were Democrats: 76% Republican to 71.8% Democrat (Goldstein 1996:
26). However, because Republicans were able to retain their basic party
structure and rules, they generally were able to choose nominees who were
more appealing to a broad spectrum of voters (Bibby 1996: 178-83).
Super Tuesday and Friends. The increase in presidential primaries to
35 for both parties by 1980 created other problems for the nominating
process. In the opinion of former President Gerald Ford, "The endless
succession of primaries just bores voters." He also complained about the
stress on candidates when primaries are scheduled on both coasts on the
same days: "Airport appearances with cameras at work became the necessity
of the day as exhausted candidates shuttled across the continent" (Ford
1985:4-5).
In response to national Democratic desires to compress the primary
season, and also to increase its own significance in nominating politics, the
South initiated the first regional primary. What would become known as
"Super Tuesday"-15 presidential primaries conducted on March 8, 1988-
began in 1980 on a much more modest scale. Encouraged by supporters of
President Jimmy Carter, three southern states (Alabama, Georgia, and
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Florida) scheduled primaries on the same day in 1980 to aid in his renomi-
nation fight against the challenge ofMassachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy.
This not only had the desired effect-Carter won a narrow renomination
victory-but it also encouraged five non-southern states to join these three in
1984.
The rout of the liberal Democratic Mondale-Ferraro ticket in 1984,
provided the greatest impetus to the creation of a "megaprimary" of 15
Southern and Border states four years later. The expressed hope in 1988 was
not only to increase Democratic primary participation and counter the shift
of moderate voters toward the Republican party, but also to expand Southern
influence in the Democratic convention so as to produce a nominee "palat-
able" to Southerners-not a Humphrey, a McGovern, or a Mondale (Hadley
and Stanley 1996:160-62).
Super Tuesday in 1988 turned out to be "a super fiasco" insofar as
Democrats were concerned. A common assessment was this conclusion of
two veteran journalists: "From the very beginning, it was a reform of far
greater interest and importance to the politicians of the South than it was to
the voters" (Germond and Witcover 1989:279). Rather than concentrating
regional influence behind a single candidate, the multi-state primary effort
produced three "winners"-two liberals, Massachusetts Governor Michael
Dukakis and African-American activist Jesse Jackson, and Tennessee Sena-
tor Al Gore, a "raging moderate" who later received little support outside the
South (Hadley and Stanley 1996:175). Dukakis and Jackson each won five
Super Tuesday states, had an almost equal share of the popular vote, and
claimed about the same number of delegates. Gore's major effect was to
knock out moderate Missouri Congressman Richard Gephardt, who might
have been acceptable to Southerners in the general election. Dukakis would
use his victories as a springboard toward nomination, so Super Tuesday
failed to produce the "palatable" candidate Southerners sought.
On the other side, this one-day voter extravaganza worked precisely as
Southerners had hoped-but for Republicans who rallied around Vice Presi-
dent George Bush. In a tight race with Kansas Senator Robert Dole to this
point, Bush won 16 of 17 Super Tuesday primaries and all but secured the
Republican nomination.
In the aftermath of yet another Democratic presidential loss, in 1988,
partisan critics complained that Super Tuesday was "too big" and lacked
focus. Some Southern and Border states also felt slighted by the media
attention paid to bigger states and opted out of Super Tuesday. The result was
a scaled-back primary four years later-to just seven states-which, ironi-
cally, produced the desired outcome: the nomination of a 1992 candidate
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acceptable to regional voters, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton. While the
South retrenched, however, the move toward regional primaries continued in
other parts of the nation, even gaining momentum in the 1990s.
A National Primary? Political parties and state legislatures have not
been the only entities concerned about and considering modifications to the
presidential nominating process. The matter also has been a periodic con-
cern of the United States Congress, although its only formal act has been to
establish a presidential primary for the District of Columbia. Altogether, 272
proposals to impose some form of national control over the nominating
process were introduced through 1979, according to one study (Gorman
1980). At least 16 additional bills relating to the candidate-selection process
were introduced in the 1980s (Norrander 1992:20). Generally, such propos-
als advocate either a one-day national primary, or a series of regional prima-
ries held within a set time frame.
Nearly 150 bills calling for the creation of a national direct primary
regulated by statute to replace national conventions operating under party
rules have been introduced in Congress since the idea was first proposed in
1911. Progressives included this provision in their 1912 party platform, and
President Wilson proposed it to Congress in 1913. Not surprisingly, most of
the reform proposals coincided in time with a perceived crisis in the nomi-
nating system: the Republican nomination in 1912, and the Democratic
conventions of 1952,1968, and 1972 (Gorman 1980:9). However, when the
particular crisis passed, interest in reform waned. Indeed, while many bills
were introduced, only three measures reached the floor of even one federal
house, and none came close to passing (Ranney 1978:1)
This overwhelming degree of failure on the part of advocates of a
nationally-regulated presidential nomination process has not deterred the
Congress from continuing to consider some means of "federalizing" presi-
dential nominations. Support for a national direct primary, obviously never
very robust, has declined to virtually nothing in recent years. As more states
adopted this method of selecting delegates, even on a piecemeal basis,
national legislators apparently lost interest. Likewise, backers of bills to
compress the delegate-selection process into a period of four months or less
have seen their goal achieved through Democratic party rules changes and
subsequent state legislation. However, there has been recent interest in
mandating a series of regional or "time zone" primaries in order to eliminate,
or reduce, the crazy-quilt pattern now in place.
Congressional interest in a regional primary concept dates from 1972.
The basic purpose of each of the more than two dozen proposals of this type
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was similar to that stated in a 1988 Senate committee report: "to provide
more order to the process by which Presidential candidates are selected by
each party and to assure that no state has inordinate influence in the process"
(U.S. Government, Senate 1988). Supporters usually came from the moder-
ate-to-liberal wings of both parties in both chambers but even conservative
members have entered the debate.
Senator Dan Quayle of Indiana, for example, displayed interest in 1981
and 1983. In 1981, he introduced legislation providing for a series of re-
gional presidential primary elections. Senator Quayle argued that the prolif~
eration of primaries and the consequent lengthening of the nominating
process had resulted in "disturbing levels of voter apathy and candidate
fatigue." In his bill, he also maintained that the disproportionate impact of a
few state primaries "impugns the integrity" of the nominating process and
that the random scheduling of primaries acts "to prevent voters from receiv-
ing a clear comparison among candidates" (U.S. Government, Senate 1981).
This bill would have set up four regional primaries to be held on the second
Tuesday of March and each of the next three months, the scheduling to be
determined by lot by the Federal Election Commission. The bill, however,
did not receive a committee hearing.
Two years later, calling the process in 1980 "a serialized national
primary, like some bad soap opera," Quayle proposed the "Presidential
Primaries Timing Act." This bill would have established a system of regional
primaries to be held on the second Tuesday of four consecutive months,
March through June, with the regions "defined so as to correspond with the
time zones within the United States." Adoption of this method, he said,
would eliminate the biggest flaw in the current system-"that it makes
irrelevant the votes of those casting their ballots late in the primary system"
(U.S. Congressional Record 1983: 18496). Although this proposal also failed
to receive a committee hearing, the idea attracted some bipartisan support.
Charles T. Manatt (1985:211), a former Democratic National Chairman,
endorsed "time-zone" primary concept in principle in 1985.
In the 1990s, however, Congressional interest has waned as various
state efforts to conduct regional, same-day primaries appear to have satisfied
national legislators, at least in regard to shortening the length of the primary
process.
Great Plains Primaries: The Pre-Reform Period
The early Progressive era direct primary movement and its later stag-
nation, the perceived failure of national conventions of either party to reflect
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the expression of popular will, and the later· impact of party reforms and
reduction of the delegate-selection time frame have been felt in the Great
Plains states. However, these factors were experienced to a greater extent in
the northern states of the region in the first 60 years of the Twentieth
Century, or the "pre-reform" period.
Two Great Plains states-Nebraska and South Dakota-have employed
the primary to select delegates to national party conventions without inter-
ruption since 1912. In Nebraska, voters have elected primary delegates who
ran uncommitted, separately from a nonbinding presidential preference poll.
The preference poll, however, often was treated with some respect and
"apparently had some influence on early balloting at conventions" (David et
al. 1994:532). In South Dakota, aspiring delegates could seek election either
as "no preference" delegates or as "pledged" with a candidate's consent.
Contests between delegate slates, either "pledged" or "no preference" oc-
curred frequently; even "no preference" slates often actually had a preferred
candidate (David et al. 1994:227,241).
North Dakota also adopted a primary in 1912 to "advise" delegates but
abandoned its use after 1932. The state did not utilize the primary again until
1980, and then only for the selection of Republican delegates as Democrats
preferred to retain the caucus system. Other Great Plains states have em-
braced the primary only very recently, with pledged candidates being the
rule. Kansas held its first primary in 1980 but not again until 1992. Both
Oklahoma and Texas established primaries in 1988, although Texas Repub-
licans did choose delegates via the primary route in 1964.
The Republican Experience. For much of the Twentieth Century, Great
Plains primary voters, particularly Republicans, displayed remarkable inde-
pendence (or isolation) from national trends, rarely preferring the eventual
nominee. Indeed, until 1956, President Calvin Coolidge (1924) was the only
Republican nominee to be victorious in the region's primaries; even he was
defeated by a narrow margin in South Dakota. Perhaps, this should be treated
only as an idle curiosity, for the popular feeling of two small states (and, for
a time, a third) had little impact on the ultimate decision. However, where
rank-and-file voters could express their preferences, these often differed
from the selections of the party-dominated caucus/convention states, not
only in the Great Plains but also in other areas of the nation. Further, it
demonstrates that voters in this region usually supported candidates decid-
edly more liberal than those eventually gaining the presidential nomina-
tions. Over these four decades, Great Plains primary voters displayed their
preferences for former President Theodore Roosevelt, Wisconsin Senator
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TABLE 2
REPUBLICAN PRIMARY PREFERENCES AND NOMINEES, 1912-1996
Kansas Nebraska N. Dakota Okla. S. Dakota Texas Nominee
1912 Roosevelt LaFollette Roosevelt W.H.Taft
1916 Cummins LaFollette Cummins Hughes
1920 Johnson Johnson Wood Harding
1924 Coolidge Coolidge Johnson Coolidge
1928 Norris Lowden unpledged Hoover
1932 France France Johnson Hoover
1936 Borah Green* Landon
1940 Dewey unpledged Willkie
1944 Stassen Christopherson* --- Dewey
1948 Stassen unpledged Dewey
1952 R.Taft R.Taft Eisenhower
1956 Eisenhower Eisenhower Eisenhower
1960 Nixon unpledged Nixon
1964 Goldwater unpledged Goldwater Goldwater
1968 Nixon Nixon Nixon
1972 Nixon Nixon Nixon
1976 Reagan Reagan Ford
1980 Reagan Reagan Reagan Reagan Reagan
1984 Reagan Reagan Reagan Reagan
1988 Bush Bush Bush Dole Bush Bush
1992 Bush Bush Bush Bush Bush Bush Bush
1996 Dole Dole Dole Dole Dole Dole
*Favorite son.
Robert LaFollette, California Senator Hiram Johnson, and Nebraska Senator
George Norris, none of whom became the party's standard-bearer.
Table 2 shows Great Plains Republican primary vote preferences com-
pared to the eventual convention choice from 1912 through 1996.
Several examples from the more contested Republican conventions
illustrate the independence of primary-selected delegates from Nebraska
and the Dakotas. In 1912, seven of these states' 36 delegates supported
Roosevelt; the remaining 29 voted "present" rather than support nominee
William Howard Taft. In 1920, Nebraska and South Dakota stayed unani-
mously with Leonard Wood and North Dakota was split between Wood and
Frank Lowden throogh nine ballots. Only on the tenth and final ballot did 17
of these states' delegates vote for nominee Warren Harding; 12 remained
steadfast with Wood.
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The region's primary voters reflected the widespread feeling against
incumbent but less than popular President Herbert Hoover in 1932. South
Dakota overwhelmingly backed a slate for Johnson, and Nebraska and North
Dakota voters gave strong support to Dr. Joseph France, a former Senator
from Maryland. France today is but a footnote in political history, but he won
seven of 14 primaries (although narrowly losing his home state) and gained
48% of the popular vote that year. However, France was rejected at the
convention by party leaders who considered France a stalking horse for
former President Calvin Coolidge and feared he would attempt to throw his
support to Hoover's predecessor. France, in fact, was ejected from the con-
vention hall by Chicago police at the behest of Hoover supporters before he
had an opportunity to speak or have his name placed in nomination
(Schlesinger 1957:296). With no other candidates to support, the region's
delegates capitulated to the inevitable, casting 37 of 39 votes for Hoover on
the only ballot of the 1932 convention.
After this point, however, the region's two primary states were more in
step with national Republican attitudes. On three occasions, however, they
perhaps reflected grass-roots feelings more than did the party organization.
In 1948, both states gave majorities to Harold Stassen and backed Thomas
Dewey only when the nomination was made unanimous. In 1952, doubtless
the more dramatic, Ohio Senator Robert Taft, victor in six of 13 primaries
with 36% of the primary vote, was turned down by a convention desperately
seeking a winner. In a divisive conclave, Republicans turned to General
Dwight Eisenhower who had finished second in the primary balloting, win-
ning five states and 27% of the primary vote. Nebraska supported Taft 13 to
4 over Eisenhower, and South Dakota gave all 14 votes to Taft. Even when
states began shifting votes, after Eisenhower's nomination was assured, 11
Nebraskans continued to support Taft, and the South Dakota delegation
divided 7 to 7.
The other instance came in 1964. Although Arizona Senator Barry
Goldwater, the eventual nominee, carried Nebraska that year with a plurality
of 49.1 %, the state's balloting was perhaps indicative of the deep Republican
cleavage in the nation: the 1960 ticket of Nixon (31.5%) and Henry Cabot
Lodge (16.3%) garnered nearly as many votes as Goldwater as write-in
candidates. Even more suggestive of the impending Republican disaster was
the result in South Dakota when a slate of unpledged delegates defeated a
Goldwater slate slightly more than two-to-one. Both Nebraska and South
Dakota returned to the fold in 1968 and 1972, giving Nixon overwhelming
support.
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TABLE 3
DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY PREFERENCES AND NOMINEES, 1912-1996
Kansas Nebraska N. Dakota Okla. S. Dakota Texas Nominee
1912 Clark Burke* Wilson Wilson
1916 Wilson Wilson Wilson Wilson
1920 Hitchcock* others+ others Cox
1924 McAdoo McAdoo McAdoo Davis
1928 Hitchcock* Smith unp1edged Smith
1932 Roosevelt Roosevelt Roosevelt Roosevelt
1936 Roosevelt Roosevelt Roosevelt
1940 Roosevelt unp1edged Roosevelt
1944 Roosevelt Hildebrandt* Roosevelt
1948 Truman Truman Truman
1952 Kefauver Kefauver Stevenson
1956 Kefauver Kefauver Kefauver
1960 Humphrey Humphrey J.Kennedy
1964 Johnson unpledged Johnson
1968 R.Kennedy R.Kennedy Humphrey
1972 McGovern McGovern McGovern
1976 Church Carter Carter
1980 Carter Carter E.Kennedy Carter Carter
1984 Hart Hart Hart Monda1e
1988 . Dukakis Dukakis Gore Gephardt Dukakis Dukakis
1992 Clinton Clinton others Clinton Kerrey Clinton Clinton
1996 Clinton Clinton Clinton Clinton Clinton Clinton
*Favorite son.
+Scattered write-ins; fewer than 400 voters participated.
The Democrat Experience. Table 3 shows the choices of Democratic
primary voters and the convention nominees from 1912 through 1996. Great
Plains Democrats proved more likely to support candidates who eventually
claimed the party's presidential nomination, although they !llso demon-
strated their independence from national trends at times during this period,
especially in the early years.
The outstanding example is the marathon 103-ballot convention of
1924 when Democrats finally nominated Wall Street lawyer James Davis.
Delegates from Nebraska and the Dakotas had strongly supported William
McAdoo through 50 ballots, then began voting for a variety of candidates-
anyone but Davis. Indeed, only one vote was cast-by a Nebraska del-
egate-for Davis from the region's primary states during the entire 17-day
proceedings. However, beginning in 1928 and for the remainder of this
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period, Nebraska and South Dakota Democrats made choices which paral-
leled popular feeling in much of the nation.
One notable exception was Tennessee Senator Kefauver, the choice of
both states in 1952 and 1956. In 1952, Kefauver won 12 of 15 primaries with
nearly 65% of the primary vote. But he lost the nomination to the "reluctant"
candidate, Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, who had not actively con-
tested any primaries. Kefauver finished second in 1956 to a more energetic
Stevenson's 51 % of the primary vote. Although Kefauver did receive 39% at
the polls, his delegate numbers were so low his name was not placed in
nomination. However, many observers believe his popular-vote showing led
to his selection as the vice-presidential nominee in the "open balloting" of
that year's convention. Indeed, Kefauver is said to have impressed the bosses
with his "ability to pull support from ordinary voters in primaries that could
coerce headlines and television attention," by one political writer who then
declared (with the benefit of a quarter-century's hindsight):
After 1956, conventions would no longer choose the nominee; he
would emerge as the survivor of the primary trail. And the excite-
ment of the convention would be largely synthetic, packaged for
projection outward in the contest between the two parties to grab,
dominate, or control public attention. (White 1982:85)
Nebraska gave overwhelming support to Senator John Kennedy of
Massachusetts (1960), President Lyndon Johnson (1964), and Senator Rob-
ert Kennedy of New York (1968). South Dakota, however, supported Senator
Hubert Humphrey from neighboring Minnesota in 1960, selected unpledged
delegates (who backed President Johnson) in 1964, and gave Robert Kennedy
49.5% of the Democratic primary vote in 1968. Curiously, the state's Demo-
crats that year awarded President Johnson 30% of their votes even though he
had withdrawn from the race more than two months before the June 4
balloting. In 1972, both states favored Senator McGovern. He ran unop-
posed in his home state of South Dakota, and the eventual Democratic
nominee gained a 41.3% plurality among 13 candidates in Nebraska.
The crowded Democratic field in Nebraska in 1972 would soon be-
come more the norm than the exception. It was an indication of things to
come as the reforms spawned by the McGovern-Fraser Commission and
subsequent party bodies would affect presidential nominating politics in
both parties in states across the nation. States in the Great Plains, however,
would join the primary parade rather later than most.
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Great Plains Primaries: The Post-Reform Period
Despite the spate of party reform efforts nationally, these did not have
an immediate impact on the Great Plains States. As indicated in the opening
of this paper, it was not until 1992 that all six states employed some form of
the primary. One reason these states did not adopt the primary more quickly
was that their legislatures were usually controlled by Republicans, who were
not enthused to apply Democratic-inspired reforms to both political parties.
Even nominally Democratic Texas was not excited about conforming wholly
to the national party approach.
In the post-reform period, however, those Plains states which used
primary elections continued occasionally to express preferences contrary to
the eventual party choices. In 1976, both Nebraska and South Dakota Re-
publican voters supported Ronald Reagan rather than President Ford. South
Dakota Democrats did support Jimmy Carter but those in Nebraska, even as
late as May 11, still preferred Idaho Senator Frank Church by a narrow
margin.
In 1980, Kansas and Texas joined the ranks of Great Plains States with
primaries. Republicans in the four states all supported Reagan, and Demo-
crats in three Plains states backed President Carter for renomination. But
South Dakota Democrats, voting June 3, gave a narrow victory to Senator
Edward Kennedy over the incumbent. Republican primary voters through-
out the Great Plains states enthusiastically endorsed President Reagan in
1984-although Kansas had dropped the procedure and South Dakota did
not bother with a primary as the president had no Republican opposition. On'
the Democratic side, Texas did not hold a primary but the party's voters in
Nebraska and the Dakotas considered Colorado Senator Gary Hart a better
alternative than Mondale by substantial margins.
The number of Great Plains primaries increased to five in 1988 with
Oklahoma entering the fold. Republicans in four states backed Vice Presi-
dent Bush, and Democrats in three states went for Dukakis. However, South
Dakota, balloting in February, supported each party's early front-runners,
Republican Senator Robert Dole and Democratic Congressman Gephardt.
Oklahoma Democrats gave Gore more votes than Gephardt and Dukakis
combined.
In 1992, with all six Great Plains states conducting primaries for the
first time, there was considerable agreement between the region's prefer-
ences and the national conventions' choices. All states backed President
Bush by wide margins over Patrick Buchanan in those states where the latter
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was on the ballot. Democrats, except in the Dakotas, showed strong support
for Arkansas Governor Clinton. In South Dakota, the eventual Democratic
nominee finished third in February voting behind Nebraska Senator Robert
Kerrey and Iowa Senator Tom Harkin. In North Dakota, a slate for "other" in
essentially advisory balloting received 85.5% of the vote. President Clinton
and Senator Dole swept the region-as was the case nationwide-in 1996.
This summary of Great Plains States' presidential preferences indi-
cates that primary voters in this region have not feared to express their
distinctiveness. This was particularly true in the first 60 years although,
admittedly, only Nebraska and South Dakota offer any substantial examples.
Prior to the initiation of the modern delegate-selection reforms in
1972, Democratic voters were more likely to support a candidate other than
the eventual party nominee. Even in the post-reform period, Democrats have
been only slightly more inclined to agree with the convention choice. Re-
publican voters proved even less favorable toward the eventual convention
choice prior to 1972 but have been overwhelmingly in agreement with
convention choices in the post-reform period.
In 36 primaries conducted in North Dakota (1912-1932), South Dakota
(1912-1968), and Nebraska (1912-1968), Democrats gave the party's stan-
dard bearer their support 15 times and preferred some other individual or an
unpledged slate 21 times. Indeed, 10 of the 15 times the voters' choices
matched the conventions' decisions came when they supported an incum-
bent president. Republicans were even more likely to prefer someone other
than the convention selection: in 36 primaries in these three states, Republi-
can party's primary voters agreed with convention nominees only eight
times, and four of these involved an incumbent president.
On the other hand, in the post-reform era, both regional parties have
been more in step with convention decisions. This is particularly true of
Republicans who have sent delegations supporting the eventual nominee in
24 of 27 primary elections held since 1972. The task was made easier for
Republicans in this period as they were usually renominating a sitting presi-
dent. The only negatives came when primary voters in both Nebraska and
South Dakota rejected President Ford in favor of Reagan in 1976, and South
Dakota voters turned down Vice President Bush for Senator Robert Dole in
1988. Democratic voters would seem to have remained more at odds with
their conventions' choices. Excluding the unanimous support given incum-
bent President Clinton in 1996, Democratic primary participants preferred
the eventual nominees only 12 of 21 times between 1972 and 1992. How-
ever, six of the nine rejections occurred in the Dakotas. South Dakota, in
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particular, has registered a contrary streak. Not only did its Democratic
primary voters opt for some other candidate in each of the primaries from
1980 through 1992, but a majority of its delegation (10 of 19) stayed with
Kennedy (1980) and Hart (1984) even though these candidates had no hope
of winning nomination.
Is a Regional Primary Needed-or Feasible?
The review of the evolution of the nominating process indicates that
not only have most states embraced the direct primary as the delegate-
selection method of choice but that, by 1996, several groupings of states
have tried to enhance their regional clout by scheduling same-day primaries.
The review also shows that the Great Plains States have been rather ambiva-
lent about adopting the primary method on an individual basis, not to men-
tion considering it collectively. Thus, the question of whether these states
should-or could-join together in creating a regional presidential primary
is not an easy one to answer.
Advocates of a Great Plains regional primary can point to standard
justifications: regional primaries would focus attention on each region and
enhance its image; they would require candidates to focus on particular
concerns of each region's residents; they would ease the physical strain on
the candidates; and they would prove more cost-effective by reducing media
expenses because television markets cross state borders.
All of these reasons have validity, and the first two certainly should be
of interest to the Great Plains states. However, except for Texas, there are no
major television markets which could cover the region sufficiently so as to
reduce media costs or ease the physical burden on candidates seeking sup-
port in a tier of states reaching more than 1,600 miles from north to south.
Further, those not in favor of a Great Plains regional primary can show that
this region is not as homogeneous as others which have a common political
culture.
Yet another reason for not holding a same-day primary has been that
the legislatures of the several states would be compelled to revise state laws
involving filing deadlines and the like in order to establish a common date.
Traditionally, Plains legislators have been reluctant to schedule early prima-
ries for two reasons: their own electoral concerns and the added costs of
establishing separate state and presidential primaries. While a March pri-
mary might be better for a state in terms of permitting voters to consider a
larger field of presidential hopefuls and enhancing its political influence, it
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might not be beneficial for state legislators if it took place while the legisla-
ture was still in session. Moreover, the expense of conducting separate
elections, especially considering the normally low voter turnout, has been
difficult to justify.
By 1996, however, such objections did not seem to be a major problem
for Great Plains states. Both North and South Dakota held Republican
presidential primaries February 27, then conducted state primaries in June.
Texas held a combined presidential-state primary March 12, and Nebraska
scheduled a joint primary May 14. However, Kansas had no difficulty in
scheduling a presidential primary April 2 and a state primary August 6; and
Oklahoma voted for convention delegates March 12 but deferred its state
primary until August 27.
There are more compelling reasons than these, however, which make
the creation of a Great Plains presidential primary appear problematical:
1. There is relatively little at stake insofar as delegates are con-
cerned. With but 328 (9.3%) of the elected delegates to the 1996
Democratic National Convention and only 252 (12.7%) of the Repub-
lican delegates, the Great Plains states would not appear to offer a
collective prize comparable to those which attract candidates to other
regional primaries.
2. There is the major problem of timing. Given the front-loading
efforts of other states, indicated earlier by Table 1, it appears virtually
impossible to schedule a Great Plains Primary in an already crowded
and shortened time frame so as to provide it with a separate identity. In
other words, with the first three Tuesdays in March already hosting
other regional primaries and with California having advanced its pri-
mary to the fourth Tuesday in March, at least in 1996, there seems to be
no date on which the Great Plains states may stand alone.
3. Texas dominates the region. Would a Great Plains Primary have
significance without the participation of a state which in 1996 had
nearly three-fifths of the Democratic delegates and almost half the
Republican delegates elected from the region? The remaining Great
Plains states face this difficulty: a regional primary without Texas may
have little meaning; but including Texas might render the remaining
states peripheral and inconsequential to campaigning in the Lone Star
State.
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Given these considerations, some critics may feel there would be no
compelling reason for the Great Plains states to enter the lists of the regional
primaries. This author believes otherwise: for if these states wish to gain
greater political visibility, a regional primary is all but compulsory.
The Great Plains states should take immediate steps to create a regional
primary. Such action would not only consolidate the now scattered impact of
this area's voters upon national politics but also would provide a forum in
which its residents could encourage national candidates to address problems
and concerns of regional interest. The potential obstacles associated with
establishing such a primary are far from insurmountable.
1. The creation of a Great Plains Primary can be accomplished
with relative ease. As four states already hold state primaries at differ-
ent times than those scheduled for presidential delegate-selection, the
choosing of a common date would seem likely to cause relatively little
disruption of the present scheduling. At present, only Nebraska would
need to alter its primary dates in any significant manner.
2. Comparing figures for 1996, the Great Plains states do not offer
a delegate prize equal to those of the Junior Tuesday, Super Tuesday,
Great Lakes, or West Coast primaries. However, as Table 4 shows, the
number of Great Plains Republican delegates is greater than those at
stake in the Yankee Primary: 251 from the Great Plains to 209 for the
northeastern states. If the megastates (Texas and New York) are ex-
cluded, the Great Plains still provide more Republican delegates (128
to 107). The numbers are not as good for Democrats: the Great Plains
states have only 397 delegates to 450 from the northeastern states, and
just 168 to 206 when the megastates are omitted.
Simply stated, Democratic numbers for the Great Plains states will
never be as sizable as those of the New England area. This is due to the
smaller population of the Great Plains and to the formula used by Democrats
to allot delegates: a combination of a state's population and its percentage of
the party's presidential popular vote averaged over the last three elections
(Bibby 1996: 181-82). However, Republicans in the Great Plains states, by
holding a common-date primary, could expect to become as grand a prize as
the more-storied northeastern states. Even with their smaller numbers, Demo-
crats could increase their national influence by joining in a same-day del-
egate-selection, especially if the event were conducted early in the primary
season.
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TABLE 4
DELEGATES SELECTED IN YANKEE PRIMARY AND GREAT
PLAINS STATES, 1996
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YANKEE PRIMARY
Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Vermont
New York
Total
Without New York
GREAT PLAINS STATES
Kansas'
Nebraska
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Texas
Total
Total Without Texas
Democrats
53
23
93
22
15
244
450
206
42 (caucus)
34
22 (caucus)
52
18 (caucus)
229
397
168
Republicans
27
15 (caucus)
37
16
12
102
209
107
31 (caucus)
23
18
38
18
123
251
128
Kansas scheduled but cancelled its primaries in 1996.
3. There is the question of timing. There is no question that the
Great Plains states should jointly select as early a date as possible in
order to be as effectual as possible. There are several scenarios which
may be considered.
It likely is not possible for all states to move both parties' primaries to
the last Tuesday in February, joining the North and South Dakota Republi-
can primaries. Republicans, however, could do this; a change in party rules
adopted at the 1996 Republican convention permits any state to conduct a
primary on or after February 1. Democratic party rules, however, permit
delegate-selection to take place only after the first Tuesday in March of each
presidential year, but for the excepted states of Iowa, Maine, New Hamp-
shire, and South Dakota. It would appear imperative for the Great Plains
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states, if they wish to enhance their political visibility, to conduct a common-
date primary as early in the season as possible. Therefore, they should agree
to one of two approaches: hold Republican delegate-selection on the final
Tuesday in February, or conduct both party's delegate-selection on the first
Tuesday in March, in direct competition with a Yankee Primary as part of
Junior Tuesday. It is true this would provide two major centers of attention
for both candidates and the media. But figures indicate the Great Plains
states have as much to offer as the northeastern states-presently the prime
focus of Junior Tuesday-and a great deal to gain in terms of political
stature.
A potential, yet less viable, solution would be for the other Plains states
to join with Oklahoma and, especially, Texas in conducting primaries on the
second Tuesday in March-joining the Super Tuesday group. Yet another
possibility-workable but unsatisfactory due to its lateness in the primary
season-would be for all states to agree on the third Tuesday of that month,
expanding the Great Lakes Primary to something on the order of a Great
Midwest Primary.2 While either of these moves would enhance the political
influence of the Great Plains, particularly that of the northern states, it is not
as satisfactory a solution as a free-standing, geographically-distinct primary
as early as possible in the primary season.
Perhaps, the most viable-and, admittedly, the most radical-solution
would be to divide the Great Plains states between two regional primaries,
placing the northern states in one in early March while continuing the
affiliation of Oklahoma and Texas with the Super Tuesday states. This is not
an option to be considered lightly. These states share a long and storied
history with the northern Great Plains, dating from even before cattlemen of
south Texas drove their herds northward along the Chisholm Trail through
Indian Territory to the railheads in Kansas.
But, as has been indicated, Oklahoma and Texas share significant
political and cultural characteristics with those Southern states which have
participated in the Super Tuesday balloting. Such a division would not only
enhance both the visibility and the input of the northern Plains states in the
delegate-selection process, but also would eliminate the probability of a
Texas-Oklahoma domination in a Great Plains Primary. However,
Oklahoma's Southern political leaning is modified somewhat along its bor-
der with Kansas, placing it in a transitional position both geographically and
politically (Shelley and Archer 1984). It is therefore possible that Oklahoma
might also feel comfortable participating apart from Texas, allowing the
Sooner State to be the largest member of a five-state same-day primary.
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Whichever choice-if any-the Great Plains states make, it will also be
impacted by actions of other states. For example, California's 1996 primary
date was only an experiment; it may allow its primary to revert to its
traditional June date. However, some California legislators have advocated
advancing its balloting to the first Tuesday in March (Stall 1996). This could
maximize California's political impact to the detriment of other frontloading
states, since California has more than 10 percent of the delegate total in each
party.
In contrast, Illinois has discussed moving its primary back, perhaps to
the last Tuesday in June. While some Illinois legislators worry that this move
would reduce the state's political clout on the national scene, other Illinois
officials suggest that a shortened campaign season would help maintain
voter interest and reduce campaign costs (Christian 1997). Such an action
would certainly reduce the impact of a Great Lakes Primary. Although far
from the most attractive alternative, this could also make the third Tuesday
of March available if the GreatPlains states desired a later date.
Thus, any of the proposed "solutions" for the Great Plains states could
be influenced by the actions of other states, and would require enabling
legislation in each individual Great Plains state. But, the time to act is now.
The election of 2000 will be a non-incumbent affair. Vice President Gore
certainly will draw challenges from other Democrats, and there appears to be
no shortage of Republican hopefuls. Great Plains voters could have an
amplified voice if a same-day regional primary is created.
The Dakotas might object to relinquishing whatever early prominence
they now have. Kansas and Nebraska might complain about advancing their
primary dates and, in the case of Nebraska, either moving its state primary
up some two months or conducting separate federal and state primary elec-
tions. Oklahoma and Texas might refuse to give up their participation in the
Super Tuesday extravaganza, or not desire to be separated. However, failing
to take action of some sort will mean that most Great Plains states will
remain hitchhikers on the road to the White House.
Notes
1. Although sources differ on the exact number of primaries, the
figures used throughout this paper for consistency are from, Congressional
Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1994).
2. The Quayle regional primary bill of 1981 would have achieved
essentially this grouping. It created "region 3" composed of all Great Plains
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states except Texas, along with Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Wis-
consin, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Puerto Rico.
References
Barone, M. and G. Ujifusa. 1995. The Almanac ofAmerican Politics, 1996.
Washington, DC: National Journal, Inc.
Bibby, J. F. 1996. Politics, Parties, and Elections in America, 3d ed. Chi-
cago: Nelson-Hall.
Buell, E. H., Jr. 1996. The Invisible Primary. In In Pursuit of the White
House: How We Choose Our Presidential Nominees, ed.W. G. Mayer,
1-43. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Christian, S. E. 1997. State board will try to shuffle election calendar.
Chicago Tribune, 10 January: sec. 1-7.
Coleman, K. J. et al. 1992. The Presidential Election Process. Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 13th ed. 1994. Washing-
ton, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
David, P. T. et al. 1994. The Politics ofNational Party Conventions, rev. ed.
New York: Vintage Books.
Davis, J. W. 1980. Presidential Primaries: The Road to the White House.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Elazar, D. J. 1984. American Federalism: A View from the States, 3d ed. New
York: Harper & Row.
Ford, G. R. 1985. The Challenge. In Before Nomination: Our Primary
Problems, ed. G. Grassmuck, 4-6. Washington, DC: American Enter-
prise Institute.
Germond, J. W. and J. Witcover. 1989. Whose Broad Stripes and Bright
Stars? The Trivial Pursuit of the Presidency, 1988. New York: Warner
Books.
Goldstein, M. 1995. Guide to the 1996 Presidential Election. Washington,
DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
Gorman, J. B. 1980. Federal Presidential Primary Proposals, 1911-1979.
Washington: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Con-
gress.
Hadley, C. D. and H. W. Stanley. 1996. The Southern Super Tuesday: South-
ern Democrats Seek Relief from Rising Republicanism. In In Pursuit of
the White House: How We Choose Our Presidential Nominees, ed. W.
G. Mayer, 158-89. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
A Great Plains Presidential Primary? 207
Kraenzel, C. F. 1955. The Great Plains in Transition. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press.
Lengle, J. I. 1981. Representation and Presidential Primaries: The Demo-
cratic Party in the Post-Reform Era. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Manatt, C. T. 1985. A New Primary System. In Before Nomination: Our
Primary Problems, ed. G. Grassmuck, 116-21. Washington, DC: Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute.
Minow, N. W. 1979. A Poor Primary System. Wall Street Journal, 13 Au-
gust:8.
Moos, M. and S. Hess. 1960. Hats in the Ring. New York: Random House.
Norrander, B. 1992. Super Tuesday: Regional Politics and Presidential
Primaries. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
Peirce, N. R. 1973. The Great Plains States ofAmerica: People, Politics and
Power in the Nine Great Plains States. New York: W. W. Norton.
Pierce, N. R. and J. Hagstrom. 1983. The Book ofAmerica: Inside 50 States
Today. New York: W. W. Norton.
Ranney, A. 1978. The Federalization ofPresidential Primaries. Washington,
DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Schlesinger, A. M., JI. 1957. The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933. Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin.
Shelley F. and C. Archer. 1984. Political Habit, Political Culture and the
Electoral Mosaic of a Border Region. Geographical Perspectives 54:7-
20.
Stall, B. 1996. March Primary's Author Sets New Goals. Los Angeles Times,
7 March:A3, A20.
U.S. Congressional Record. 1983. Vol. 129, part 14.
U.S. Government, Senate. 1981. S.1336. 97th Cong., 1st sess.
U.S. Government, Senate. 1988. S.Rept. 100-549. 100th Cong., 2d. sess.
Wayne, S. J. 1996. The Road to the White House: 1996. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Webb, W. P. 1931. The Great Plains. Waltham, MA: Blaisdell Publishing.
White, T. H. 1982. America in Search ofItself' The Making ofthe President,
1956-1980. New York: Harper & Row.
White, T. H. 1969. The Making of the President-1968. New York:
Antheneum Publishers.
